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Abstract
We examine a setting where agents can form lobbying coalitions to inuence a
policy-maker. Policy uniformity causes agents to free ride on each others lobbying and
gives them an incentive to form lobbying coalitions. We investigate when coalitions
are formed by similar or dissimilar agents and show that endogenous coalition forma-
tion causes the e¤ects of policy uniformity and lobbying costs on aggregate lobbying
activity and policy strength to be non-monotonic. Our model suggests that increased
competition in the market for coalition-facilitating lobbyists can lead to less lobbying.
We discuss implications for the regulation of 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1 Introduction
Regulatory policies are usually set with a degree of uniformity, applying similar treatments
to diverse agents. These agents, in turn, often have the ability to inuence the policies they
are exposed to and can organize into coalitions or lobbies that coordinate their inuence
activities. In this paper, we explore the agentschoices of how to organize into lobbies, and
how agentsability to organize inuences their lobbying activities and a regulators choices.
In our model, a regulator (or enforcement agency) chooses the policies that apply to a
set of heterogeneous agents. Each agent can take an action that is privately benecial but
socially harmful, and stronger regulatory policies reduce the probability that the agents suc-
ceed at taking their socially ine¢ cient actions. The regulator is interested in minimizing the
welfare losses, but can be inuenced by the agents, who lobby for weaker policies. Although
the agents in our model di¤er in the socially-harmful but privately-benecial actions they can
take, the regulator is constrained to treat the agents similarly (though not necessarily equiv-
alently). With lobbying, exposing di¤erent agents to similar policies causes an externality of
one agents lobbying on other agentspolicies, which, in turn, results in a lobbying-related
free-rider problem among agents (Friedman and Heinle, 2016). To overcome the free-rider
problem and, thus, to more e¤ectively reduce the extent of regulation or enforcement, agents
can organize into lobbying coalitions, i.e., lobbies.
As a motivating example, we consider the regulation of nancial institutions. Regula-
tors such as the Federal Reserve write capital rules, run stress tests, and perform on-site
examination reviews to help ensure the stability of the nancial system. These regulatory
actions reduce nancial institutionsopportunities to pursue strategies that impose systemic
risk on the economy (e.g., excess leverage and risk-taking, insu¢ cient capital bu¤ers). Fi-
nancial institutions di¤er in their systemic importance, e.g., due to size, complexity, or
connectedness. While federal laws recognize this heterogeneity, they also prescribe a degree
of homogeneous treatment. For example, all bank holding companies (BHCs) are subject
to the Feds safety and soundness regulation. But, with the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act,
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BHCs with more than $50 billion in assets were made subject to additional prudential re-
quirements. Congresss passage of Dodd-Frank set the $50 billion threshold and the nature
of the prudential requirements while delegating to the Feds Board of Governors authority
to set the specic regulations (see Section 165 of the Dodd-Frank Act). A commitment to
partial regulatory uniformity manifests in this example via the Feds statutory charge to set
prudential standards for all BHCs, with enhanced standards for large BHCs.1
Financial institutions lobby both individually and in coalitions. Public lobbying lings
list several multi-rm lobbying organizations, including the American Bankers Association,
the Credit Union National Association, the Independent Community Bankers of America,
and the Financial Services Roundtable. Aside from forming their own lobbying organizations,
di¤erent nancial institutions can also retain the services of the same lobbyist to facilitate
coordination. For example, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, Hartford Financial Services Agents,
and other nancial institutions retained the services of Subject Matter, a lobbying services
rm.2 Through meetings with Fed sta¤and other regulators (e.g., the SEC, FDIC, and OCC)
several nancial institutions and lobbying coalitions have attempted to inuence rule-making
in the wake of Dodd-Frank.
Our model consists of three agents, which can represent specic nancial institutions (e.g.,
Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, and Wells Fargo) or sets of rms (e.g., systemically important
BHCs, other large banks, and regional credit unions). We assume that there is a cost of
forming a coalition and that the cost increases in the size of the coalition. Additionally,
we assume that each coalition needs a specialist (or lobbyist) to enable within-coalition
coordination. Lobbyists cannot force agents to join coalitions, but they extract a fraction of
1Regulatory oversight via a patchwork of regulators provides another example of partially uniform regu-
lation. For instance, in the U.S., the O¢ ce of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) regulates nationally
chartered banks, the Federal Reserve, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and state-level banking
departments oversee state-chartered banks. Finally, the Federal Reserve and Financial Stability Oversight
Council (FSOC) regulate bank holding companies and Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs),
which can include large insurers and asset managers. In other words, the US Congress, through laws that
set up di¤erent regulators for di¤erent sets of nancial institutions and overlapping oversight responsibilities,
has enacted a degree of partial uniformity in the regulation of nancial rms in the US.
2Unless otherwise noted, lobbying data comes from https://www.opensecrets.org/.
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the net coalition gains from coalition formation.
We focus on the implications of endogenously-formed coalitions. To dene an equilibrium
coalition, we introduce the notion of o¤er-stable coalitions. When a set of coalition members
receive an o¤er to deviate, o¤er-stable coalitions can prevent these members from leaving by
making a successful countero¤er. As such, o¤er-stability is closely related to notions based
on the core and bargaining sets (e.g., Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944; Aumann and
Maschler, 1964; Ray and Vohra, 1999). In our setting with heterogeneous agents, externali-
ties, and not necessarily superadditivity, o¤er-stability predicts at least one stable coalition
structure for any feasible set of parameters, while other equilibrium notions may not. When
o¤er-stability predicts multiple stable coalition structures, we allow the lobbyist to break
the tieand form the coalition that provides her with the greatest benet.3 Interestingly,
we nd that this coalition formation mechanism can support the grand coalition, a coalition
of the two agents with the largest potential for private benets, or a coalition between the
agents with the smallest and the largest potential for private benets. The only coalition
that is never stable is the one that includes the two agents with the smallest potential for
private benets. In other words, o¤er-stable coalitions can be between either similar agents
(i.e., medium and large), between dissimilar agents (small and large), or between all agents.
We show that regulatory uniformity has non-monotonic e¤ects on aggregate lobbying
and policy strength when coalitions form endogenously. This occurs because uniformity, by
promoting free-riding between lobbying agents, encourages them to form coalitions. That
is, uniformity tends to decrease lobbying and strengthen regulatory policies, as in Friedman
and Heinle (2016), but also causes agents to coalesce into new or larger lobbying coalitions.
Coalition formation and expansion cause discrete jumps in the agentsability to overcome
free-rider problems, leading to increased lobbying and, in turn, weaker policies.4
Additional comparative statics show similar non-monotonicities related to the costs of
3The unique coalition predicted by o¤er-stability and the lobbyists preferences is in the core when the
core is non-empty. Additionally, o¤er-stable equilibrium coalitions exist even when the core is empty.
4This result should also hold in a setting with a continuous mass of rms when the number of coalitions
is discrete and endogenous.
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lobbying and the costs of coalition formation. Higher lobbying costs directly lead to less lob-
bying and less distorted policy, which in turn reduces the free-riding problem that motivates
coalition formation. However, in our setting, one agent benets when the two other agents
form a coalition, because the coalition members increase their lobbying and this tends to
weaken the regulation imposed on the non-coalition agent. Typically, higher lobbying costs
lead to smaller coalitions, but there are sets of parameters for which higher lobbying costs can
cause the coalition structure to transition from two-agent to three-agent, through the non-
proportional inuence on coalition-member and non-coalition agents. Changes in coalition
costs, through similar mechanisms, can have non-monotonic e¤ects on coalition structures,
and, through their inuence on the coalition structure, have non-monotonic e¤ects on lob-
bying and policy strength. In contrast, an increase in the lobbyistsshare of the gains from
coalition formation, i.e., a decrease in competition in the unmodeled lobbying sector, always
causes a shift towards larger coalitions. This tends to increase total lobbying and decrease
average regulatory strength. Restricting the supply of lobbyists (e.g., through laws against
revolving doors), can thus have a negative e¤ect on regulatory strength and can increase the
degree to which policies are inuenced by lobbying.
Beyond the regulation of systemically important nancial institutions, the central ten-
sions in our model carry over to several settings. These key tensions arise from a set of
agents who can form coalitions, di¤er in their abilities to take actions that are socially harm-
ful (e.g., through negative externalities, lower consumer surplus, or tax burdens imposed on
unrelated parties), and face at least partially homogeneous regulations (e.g., safety standards
or activity-based subsidies).5 The importance of coalitions in particular is highlighted by
recent popular press articles, noting that Corporate America cant seem to get enough of
the ad hoc coalitions that are formed to put muscle and money behind a lobbying push,
5Donelson et al. (2016) examine potential determinants of regulatory preferences for rules-based versus
principles-based standards. Interestingly, they capture the degree to which a standard is rules-based with
both the number of bright-line thresholds, which tend towards one-size-ts-all, and the amount of scope and
legacy extensions, which relate more to individualized regulations. Their construct denition suggests that
rules-based standards can be either more uniform or less uniform than principles-based standards.
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and hardly a week passes in Washington without a new group appearing on the scene.
(Bogardus, 2013).6
1.1 Related literature
The foundation for our study is the literature on lobbying and policy choice in economics,
which shows how lobbying and regulatory capture can cause regulators to choose non-welfare-
maximizing rules and transfers (e.g., Stigler, 1971; Grossman and Helpman, 1996). Our
model is most closely related to Friedman and Heinle (2016), who present a two-agent model
involving a regulator who can probabilistically prevent a privately costly but socially waste-
ful action through regulation but is subject to regulatory capture via lobbying pressure.
Similarly, Rodrik (1986) analyzes trade-o¤s between industry-wide tari¤s and rm-specic
subsidies in a setting in which industry-wide tari¤s promote free-riding on rms tari¤-
seeking. However, the models in Friedman and Heinle (2016) and Rodrik (1986) preclude
the formation of lobbying coalitions, leaving agents no way to overcome the free-riding prob-
lem generated by uniform policies. Similarly, Bebchuk and Neeman (2010) investigate a
model in which di¤erent groups lobby the regulator over the level of investor protection in
a perfectly uniform regulatory regime. Although this is a regime in which coalitions would
be most valuable (as we show in our model), lobbying coalitions are assumed impossible. In
Bertomeu and Magee (2011, 2014, 2015), regulatory outcomes are chosen by a combination
of a majoritarian vote by rms and the standard setters bliss point. In their model, as in
most that feature voting as the policy selection tool, voter collusion (e.g., via trading or
selling votes) is excluded by assumption.
Several studies have examined the regulation of nancial institutions, especially banks.
Focal issues include deposit insurance to prevent ine¢ cient bank runs (Diamond and Dyb-
vig, 1983), nancial contagion and systemic risk (Acharya, 2009), risk-taking incentives and
6Bogardus (2013) and Ho (2015) provide examples of: FedEx, Nike, and Verizon joining coalitions lob-
bying for tax reform; Intel, Microsoft, Qualcomm, and Texas Instruments lobbying through a coalition for
immigration reform; and 3M, Caterpillar, and GE lobbying through the Coalition for 21st Century Patent
Reform for revisions to laws covering patents.
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capital regulation (Kim and Santomero, 1988), banking unions and supra-national banking
regulation (Foarta, 2018), bank branching restrictions (Kroszner and Strahan, 1999), nan-
cial reporting (Acharya and Ryan, 2016), and disclosure of information such as inspection
and stress test results (Goldstein and Sapra, 2014). Studies of these issues typically examine
whether particular regulatory interventions can address specic frictions arising in nancial
institutions.
Our study instead focuses on regulatory inuence, which has received signicant interest
from empirical researchers. This recent interest has been facilitated by novel large-sample
data capturing rmsand coalitionslobbying activities and expenditures. Lambert (2018)
nd that banks that lobby are signicantly less likely to face enforcement actions. Igan and
Mishra (2014) and Igan et al. (2012) suggest that the nancial industrys lobbying succeeded
in preventing or softening regulation prior to the nancial crisis. Johnson and Kwak (2011)
provide an overview of the nancial industrys lobbying and its plausible e¤ects on nancial
regulation in the wake of and leading up to nancial crises. Outside of banking, Blanes i Vi-
dal et al. (2012), Bertrand et al. (2014), and Kang and You (2018) suggest that lobbyists use
their connections to politicians and are able to extract monetary premiums for their connec-
tions. Cooper et al. (2010) examine cross-sectional associations between corporate campaign
contributions and future stock returns. Despite the interest in the e¤ects of lobbying and the
ubiquity of lobbying coalitions, few studies have explicitly considered coalition formation.7
Our study suggests that such consideration might yield novel insights.
Crucially, our study examines the interplay between regulatory uniformity, lobbying, and
coalition formation. Recent studies of banking regulators in particular have highlighted how
the structure of banking regulators can lead to more or less uniformity. Agarwal et al. (2014)
show that treatment varies depending on whether bank examiners come from state or federal
agencies. Similarly, Gopalan et al. (2017) documents that the presence of a more local OCC
7A notable exception is Bombardini and Trebbi (2012), who relate the proportion of lobbying expendi-
tures undertaken via cooperative channels (e.g., industry lobbies) to measures of competition and product
di¤erentiation at the industry level.
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eld o¢ ce is associated with less risky choices by OCC-chartered banks. If local o¢ ces apply
more tailored bank supervision than less local o¢ ces, our model suggests that closing local
eld o¢ ces may lead to the formation of larger regional lobbying coalitions. Foarta (2018)
models a banking union with cross-country transfers of capital for bailouts but a national
distribution of these funds. While a banking union between countries improves welfare when
the national governments are benevolent, their own rent-seeking behavior can make a union
ine¢ cient. Foarta (2018) suggests that a full union, which also decides about the allocation
of funds, is more e¢ cient. Our model suggests that a full union may lead to larger lobbying
coalitions that may undo the benets of the union.
Because we investigate coalition formation, our analysis is related to the literature on co-
operative game theory, which we discuss in Appendix B. Coalition formation also appears in
several applied settings. In studies of trade policy, lobbies can inuence regulation involving
socially ine¢ cient tari¤s and subsidies.8 Lobbies in di¤erent industries compete for trade
subsidies, generating negative externalities, in contrast to the lobbies in our model, which
have positive externalities on each other. Mitra (1999), for example, allows rms to form
lobbies to coordinate their e¤orts on lobbying for trade protections or subsidies. Lobbies
pay an exogenous cost of organizing, but only rms within the same industry can organize
with each other and the regulator has to treat all rms within an industry identically. The
focus of Mitra (1999) is on which types of industries get organized, rather than which types
of parties join together when not all rms need to participate. Additionally, Mitra (1999)
considers rms in disorganized industries as too small to lobby individually, in contrast
to our paper in which individual agents can lobby successfully. Pecorino (1998) considers
symmetric rms that repeatedly play a stage game in which they lobby and a tari¤ is cho-
sen. The schedule that transforms aggregate lobbying into tari¤s is exogenously given, and
Pecorino (1998) explores trigger strategies (i.e., reversions to non-cooperative play) that can
8Beyond lobbying, endogenous coalitions are important in theories explaining the formation and actions
of clubs (e.g., Ellickson et al., 1999 or Nordhaus, 2015), cartels, customs unions, and research and public
goods coalitions (e.g., Yi, 1997).
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sustain cooperation amongst lobbying rms. Pecorino (1998) shows that sustaining lobby-
ing cooperation can be either more di¢ cult or less di¢ cult as the number of rms in the
industry grows. Magee (2002) extends Pecorino (1998) by endogenizing the schedule that
maps contributions to tari¤s.
Beyond trade, Damania and Fredriksson (2000) explore coalition formation in a repeated
game with two rms that jointly lobby the government for lower pollution taxes and also
compete in a product market. Damania and Fredriksson (2000) focus on how collusion in
the product market and the rms discount rates inuence the rms incentives to form
coalitions. Finally, Drazen et al. (2007) focus on the implications of contribution caps on
bargaining between interest groups and politicians. The model builds on Grossman and
Helpman (1994), exploring lump-sum taxes that cover a subsidy provided to capital owners
who lobby in favor of the subsidy. As in Mitra (1999), all rms within a sector can pay a
xed cost to form a lobby. Drazen et al. (2007) exogenously assume a number of competing
sectors that are organized. Introducing contribution caps can push some lobbies out, which
makes the remaining lobbies better o¤.
Building on the prior literature, we focus on the interaction between regulatory uniformity
and coalition formation. In contrast to prior work, we allow for degrees of uniformity and are
interested in which agents form a like-minded coalition, while much of the prior literature
assumes that either all-rms or no-rms in a given industry form a coalition. In contrast to
much of the trade literature, we focus on a setting in which all agents lobby for a similar
type of policy, so there is no competition between lobbying groups. Our agent heterogeneity
can capture both within-industry and across-industry varieties, and we focus on which rms,
if any, form coalitions.
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2 Model
In the model, there are ve risk neutral actors: three agents, a policy-setter/regulator, and
a lobbyist. Agents are indexed by i 2 fs;m; `g for small, medium, and large, respectively.
Each agent can take a privately-benecial action, for which she gains Di, where 0 < Ds <
Dm < D`. The action associated with Di imposes a social cost of (1 + )Di, where  > 0.9
The privately-benecial action is therefore socially ine¢ cient and imposes a net welfare loss
of Di > 0. Our assumption of Di > 0 implies that each agent always prefers to take
the privately-benecial action. For ease of exposition, we refer to agents with higher Di as
larger and agents with lower Di as smaller, where size relates to the impact of the privately-
benecial action and can reect, for instance, systemic importance or complexity.
Regulation limits each agents opportunity to take the privately-benecial action (e.g.,
through site inspections, audits, and restrictions on short-term debt or credit exposures).
Specically, we model the intensity of regulation governing each agent i as the probability,
i, that the agent is unable to take the action. Finally, before the regulator species the
regulatory intensities, each agent can exert e¤ort Bi to lobby the regulator to relax the
regulatory intensity she faces.
Agents benet only from the privately-benecial action. Each agent incurs a personal
cost of lobbying the regulator, c
2
B2i . The parameter c > 0 captures the ability of agents to
e¤ectively lobby. A higher value of c reects a less severe problem related to the lobbying
that facilitates ine¢ cient regulatory policies. Each agents expected utility is given by
Ui = (1  i)Di   c
2
B2i . (1)
With probability (1  i), the agent is able to take the privately-benecial action and con-
sume Di. Agents always bear the cost of lobbying because they lobby the regulator before
the action is taken. We assume that agents cannot commit to share the spoilswith the
9Agents in our model are heterogeneous in the impact of their actions, although they are homogeneous
in the proportional costs of their actions, 1 + .
9
regulator to extract regulatory concessions.
When the regulator chooses regulatory intensity, the costs of lobbying, c
2
B2i , are sunk.
Therefore, the aggregate utility that can be inuenced by the regulator is given by the
expected losses from the agentsactions:
L (;D; ) =  
X
i2fs;m;`g
Di (1  i) : (2)
The welfare-interested regulator is only concerned about the actions because of the welfare
loss,  D = 
P
i2fs;m;`gDi, that the actions impose on society. This welfare loss occurs with
probability (1  i), for each agent i. The regulator wants to minimize this welfare loss
subject to the costs of regulation.10
Regulation is costly for three reasons. First, regulation is costly in and of itself, with a
convex cost of regulation, 1
2
2i , for regulation covering each agent. More stringent regulation
and enforcement, e.g., more frequent bank inspections, naturally require larger sta¤s and
potentially more costly training. Second, each agent can inuence the regulator through
lobbying activity Bi, which increases the cost of regulatory intensity by Bii.11 Third,
dening a di¤erent regulatory intensity for di¤erent agents imposes additional costs, which we
model as k
2
P
i

i   12
P
i0 6=i i0
2
. We interpret the parameter k as the degree of regulatory
uniformity; when k = 0, the regulator is free to choose individualized regulation without
incurring any penalty whereas the regulator sets the same regulatory intensity for all agents
as k ! 1, enacting a one-size-ts-all uniform regime. Crucial for our results is that the
regulator is committed to apply somewhat similar regulatory policies to di¤erent agents.
10We assume that the regulator cares only about the welfare loss. Glaeser et al. (2001) model judges
and regulators as alternative enforcement mechanisms and assume that regulators, while easier to motivate,
can also be overzealous and prefer excessively-strict policies. In such a setting, lobbying can be benecial
as a counterweight to regulators overzealousness. See Friedman and Heinle (2016) for further discussion of
interpretations of c, , and i.
11Much of the related literature (building on Grossman and Helpman (1996)) uses a menu-auction approach
in which the agents contribute an amount in exchange for an amount of lobbying. Note that this is a technical
di¤erence, rather than one of substance, as the underlying economic forces are similar. See Gregor (2011)
for a recent review of the literature on lobbying.
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The total cost of regulation is given by
C (;B; k) =
X
i2fs;m;`g
0@2i
2
+Bii +
k
2
 
i   1
2
X
i0 6=i
i0
!21A , (3)
and the regulators objective function is
UR = L (;D; )  C (;B; k) . (4)
Agents, in turn, can form coalitions to coordinate their lobbying e¤orts. A coalition is
dened as a set of agents, denoted by lj  fi : i is a member of coalition jg, where j indicates
a particular coalition. Each coalition also includes a lobbyist (described below). We impose
an increasing cost to forming larger lobbies, dened as jlj j, where jljj is the number of
agents in the lobby, with 1 = 0 < 2 < 3. These costs prevent the payo¤ structure from
generally being superadditive. Aumann and Dreze (1974) discuss how di¢ culties associated
with collaboration, such as transaction costs of side payments or within-coalition monitoring,
would give rise to such size-based coalition costs.12 Additionally, these costs could be a¤ected
by institutional mechanisms that combat coalition formation.
There are ve possible coalition structures, as shown in Table 1.
Structure name Notation Coalition structure
Independent agents I ffsg ; fmg ; f`gg
Small-medium lobby sm ffs;mg ; f`gg
Small-large lobby s` ffs; `g ; fmgg
Medium-large lobby m` ffsg ; fm; `gg
Grand lobby G ffs;m; `gg
Table 1
Coalition Structures
Let Ui;lj be the expected utility before coalition costs, jlj j, generated by agent i in
12Allowing the two-agent coalition costs to depend on which rms are in the coalition would potentially
make the sm coalition feasible at the cost of added complexity. For the sake of parsimony, we assume that
coalition costs only depend on the number of coalition partners.
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coalition structure lj 2 fI; sm; s`;m`;Gg. For example, Ui;I is the expected utility generated
by agent i if all agents lobby independently, Us;m` is the expected utility generated by agent
s when agents m and ` form a coalition together, and Um;G is the expected utility generated
by agent m in the grand coalition, G. Furthermore, let Ulj =
P
i2lj Ui;lj be the cumulative
utility generated by all members of a coalition, e.g., UG =
P
i Ui;G. We dene the (potentially
negative) net gains from coalition formation as
Ulj = Ulj   jlj j  
P
i2lj Ui;I .
The gain from coalition formation reects the additional expected utility for the agents in
the coalition net of the coalition costs, prior to splitting any net gains with the lobbyist.
The lobbyist, who is necessary for coalition formation, can extract an exogenous fraction
of Ulj . We assume that the agents keep a fraction  2 (0; 1] of these gains and that the
lobbyist keeps the remaining (1  ).13 The share that the lobbyist retains captures the
competitiveness or specialization in the lobbying sector, as, in our model, only one coalition
at most will form. The lobbyists utility is given by
UL (lj) = (1  ) Ulj . (5)
This assumption reects the idea that the lobbyist owns a technology necessary for coalition
formation.14 We interpret jlj j as a monitoring cost of ensuring compliance with the coali-
tions strategy, rather than a fee paid to the lobbyist. Essentially, the lobbyist is necessary
for the coalition to exist (in a binary sense), and her fee is a fraction of the gains from
coalition formation net of within-coalition monitoring costs. In some sense, the lobbyist
13We cover the case of  = 0 in the Appendix following the solution for low , and obtain similar qualitative
results for  = 0 as for low values of :
14Essentially, only the lobbyist owns the technology to facilitate collusion on lobbying between insiders.
Because there can be no more than one multi-agent coalition in our three-agent setting, we assume that
there is only one lobbyist. This abstracts from explicit competition between lobby-forming specialists, but
substantially simplies the problem.
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is a monitoring device that helps ensure that the coalition members pursue strategies that
maximize the coalitions net gain.
Within a lobby, utility is transferable. This is a convenience assumption, as our interest is
in the e¤ects of coalitions on lobbying activity and policy choice, rather than within-coalition
allocations of utility. When agents choose their lobbying activities, whether individually or
jointly, the coalition costs, jlj j, are sunk. So, the agents who are joined in a particular
lobby choose lobbying e¤orts to maximize
P
i2lj Ui;lj , which maximizes the total amount
split between the agents and the lobbyist.
Table 2 shows the timeline.15 We leave the issue of coalition formation open for now
and return to it after Section 3, where we derive the regulatory policies and lobbying strate-
gies conditional on coalition structures. Throughout the analysis, we use the terms lobby
and coalition interchangeably. We solve for the Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium using
backward induction.
t = 0 t = 1 t = 2 t = 3
Coalition Agents choose Regulator chooses Privately-benecial
formation inuence activities regulatory intensities actions may occur
lj Bi i Payo¤s
Table 2
Timeline
2.1 Discussion of main assumptions
The model features three agents who di¤er in the e¤ects of their privately benecial, socially
costly actions. If the potential harm to society is proportional to assets, we could interpret
15In practice many lobbying e¤orts are coordinated through long-lived institutions (or rms). Simply
repeating the one-shot game depicted in the timeline would allow for the coalition formation cost  to be
founded on the probability of observing deviations from coalition strategies and associated punishments as
in Damania and Fredriksson (2000). Additionally, agents may form coalitions prior to knowing exactly what
the potential new regulation is going to be. In our model, we could allow  to be drawn from a commonly
known distribution at t = 2. In our linear-quadratic structure, lobbying strategies would be una¤ected but
the gains from coalition formation may depend on the uncertainty over , in part because of risk-sharing
agreements within coalitions as in Wilson (1968).
13
agent ` as JPMorgan Chase & Co. (~$2.5 trillion in assets), agentm as US Bancorp (~$450 in
assets) and agent s as Suntrust (~$200 billion in assets).16 Alternatively, individual agents
could represent types of nancial institutions or the degree of interconnectedness; it may
be the case that large banks or exchanges (`) are more systemically important than large
insurers or brokers (m) and asset managers (s).
While we capture the regulators commitment with the k-based cost, alternative ways
of modeling commitment generate similar forces. For instance, we could assume that the
regulator receives a benet from more similar regulation, which may reect a regulators
preference for comparability (see (Ray, 2017)). Alternatively, we could assume that the
regulator maximizes utility subject to some constraints that force regulatory similarity, such
as g   1  i  g + 1 , with the commitment to uniformity captured by  > 0. One of
the main economic consequences of uniformity is the free rider problem induced by agent
is lobbying a¤ecting g. In a setting where the commitment comes from similarity bounds
given by  rather than a cost of dissimilarity given by k, agent is lobbying e¤orts will a¤ect
g as long as some -based constraints bind.17
Given that heterogeneous regulation plausibly requires greater care in drafting and in-
creased expenditures in enforcement (e.g., sta¤ costs), k can be interpreted as a technical
constraint on the regulator. Alternatively, k could be an institutional commitment (for ex-
ample, a legislative mandate) to regulate di¤erent rms in a similar fashion, such as the
buckets for nancial rms on either side of the $50 billion threshold discussed above.18 No-
tably, rules-based policies applying to multiple rms is ubiquitous, potentially due to cost
savings and the potential for rules (e.g., limited discretion) to mitigate agency issues within
the regulator. In the setting of the regulation of nancial institutions, higher k might reect a
single regulator covering a broader set of rms (e.g., the Federal Reserve supervising system-
16Amounts based on annual reports dated December 31, 2016.
17The similarity-bounds and cost-constraint can be linked if the regulator can, at an earlier stage, pay a
k-based cost to reduce .
18Discussing a recently-passed Senate bill, Ackerman (2018) notes that Dodd-Frank limits the Feds reach
because it spells out that all banks above $50 billion in assets must face stricter rules.
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ically important nancial institutions whether they are banks, insurers, or asset managers),
explicit moves towards uniformity, consistency across bank regulators, or centralization of
tasks or o¢ ces. Lower values of k might reect a regulatory environment in which there are
several regulators, each with a di¤erent domain (e.g., the OCC, state regulators, and FDIC
covering di¤erent types of banks). Agarwal et al. (2014) provide evidence that di¤erent reg-
ulators apply di¤erent standards, suggesting that having the same regulator leads to more
uniform treatment than having di¤erent regulators (who might, essentially, face di¤erent
regulatory cost functions). The closing of the O¢ ce of Thrift Supervision and the transfer
of its oversight responsibilities to the Fed and OCC could be used as a shock to de facto
regulatory uniformity (see Granja and Leuz, 2017). Similarly, recent proposed increases of
the enhanced supervision threshold from $50 billion would provide another potential shock
to the buckets within which rms face more uniform regulation (Ackerman and Tracy, 2018;
Ackerman, 2018).
Even within the Fed, di¤erent regional o¢ ces may have di¤erent policies.19 The Fed can
take actions to promote uniformity across o¢ ces or allow o¢ ces to decide on enforcement pri-
orities more independently. A recent federal report (GAO, 2017) noted that implementation
of LISCC [Large Institution Supervisory Coordinating Committee] policies has been inconsis-
tent across reserve banks. To some extent, this inconsistency may be related to the structure
of the Federal Reserve; specically, all 12 Reserve Banks operate semi-independently from
one another,and that as a result of inconsistencies, the OC [LISCC Operating Commit-
tee] endorsed the development of a LISCC Program Manual to implement policies more
consistently. Carletti et al. (2016) describe agency issues within bank supervisor hierarchies.
Centralized bank supervision implies greater uniformity while local bank supervision allows
for more regulatory heterogeneity.
There are other institutional settings that are similar in spirit. In the European Union,
some bank oversight responsibilities fall under the European Central Bank (ECB) while other
19Additionally, the Fed may apply di¤erent standards in individual rmsstress tests.
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parts are the responsibilities of country-specic central banks. ECB-designated oversight
is likely to be more uniform than oversight activities undertaken separately by di¤erent
countriescentral banks. Goyal et al. (2013) discuss the potential move to a banking union
in the Euro area, which would homogenize treatment of banks across member countries.
In China, the government recently announced a plan to consolidate the separate bank and
insurance regulators into one agency (Wong, 2018).
We use a continuous k rather than a binary indicator for complete uniformity to allow
for smoother transitions across regimes and comparative statics analysis with ner regime
gradations. While we take k as an exogenous parameter, Friedman and Heinle (2016) examine
how a system designer, such as a legislature, would optimally set k in a setting with two
agents who cannot form a coalition. For instance, the legislature could decide to mandate
centralized decision-making or to let each OCC o¢ ce or FRB have its own policies.
3 Regulation and inuence activities
Given lobbying e¤orts, the regulator chooses regulatory intensities in period t = 2 as
arg min
i;i2fs;m;`g
P
i

 (1  i)Di + 
2
i
2
+Bii +
k
2

i   12
P
i0 6=i i0
2
. The rst-order-conditions
(FOC) are a set of three equations that imply,
^i =
4 (Di  Bi) + 9k


D
3
  B
3

4 + 9k
, (6)
where B =
P
i2fs;m;`gBi. In what follows, we derive the optimal lobbying e¤orts, conditional
on the coalition structure. We assume throughout that the exogenous parameters are such
that regulation is dened by (6) and ^i 2 (0; 1)8i.
In each setting, a coalition (including a one-agent coalition) chooses lobbying to maximize
the expected utility of its members, which is
P
i2lj Uiji=^i , where Ui is dened in (1) and
^i is dened in (6). We do not specify transfers within lobbies, restricting them only to be
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feasible (i.e., the sum of the individual utilities of the lobby members equals the total utility
of the members of the lobby).
To develop the optimal lobbying, regulatory strengths, and expected agent and lobbyist
utilities for each of the coalition structures, we introduce additional notation. Specically, to
represent agents within coalition structures, we use the subscripts fg; h; ig to denote di¤erent
agents, where g; h; i 2 fs;m; `g and g 6= h 6= i. This allows us to introduce exible terms, like
Dgh = Dg+Dh as a stand-in for each of Dsm, Ds`, and Dm`. Additionally, letD2gh = D
2
g+D
2
h,
and D2 =
P
iD
2
i . The proof of the following Lemma exploits this notation.
Lemma 1 There exists a unique equilibrium
n
B^i;j; ^i;j
o
for each coalition structure j.
Whenever the regulator is at least somewhat constrained to enact uniform regulation, i.e.,
whenever k > 0, the free-riding problem between agents provides an opportunity for gains
from forming coalitions. Whenever agents form coalitions, they lobby more because they
internalize the e¤ect of their lobbying on the other agents(s) in the coalition. This reduces
regulatory strength for all agents (that is, B^i;I  B^i;ig  B^i;G and ^i;I  ^i;ig  ^i;G).
Furthermore, regulatory uniformity implies that the non-coalition member (e.g., agent i in
the presence of the gh coalition) faces weaker regulation even though that agent lobbies as
if all agents were independent (B^i;gh = B^i;I and ^i;I  ^i;gh).
Although lobbying e¤orts are greater, each agentsexpected utility is also greater, and
not just for the members of the coalition. Note that absent coalition costs, the combined
expected utility of all coalitions is greatest for the three-agent coalition, and lowest when
each agent lobbies independently, as
U^G > U^i;gh + U^gh;gh > U^s;I + U^m;I + U^`;I , (7)
where U^i;I = (1  ^i;I)Di   12c
 
4+3k
4+9k
2
D2i . Finally, the gains from forming coalitions are
increasing in the degree of regulatory uniformity, k, as d
dk
 
Ulj

> 0.
To facilitate the exposition, we introduce e¤ective coalition formation costs, E2 =
17
2
2c(4+9k)2
9k2
and E3 = 3
2c(4+9k)2
9k2
. These e¤ective coalition formation costs incorporate the
parameters associated with the net costs and benets of lobbying, c and k, that a¤ect
the net gains from coalition formation. That is, c and k only a¤ect the equilibrium coali-
tion structure through E2 and 
E
3 . Additionally, we let 
G
I =

U^G  
P
i U^i;I

E3 =3 =
2

D2 +DsDm +DsD` +DmD`

. There is a net benet to the formation of the grand coali-
tion if GI  E3 > 0 and a net benet to the formation of the m` coalition if D2m` E2 > 0.20
Similarly, let Ggh =
2c(4+9k)2
9k2

U^G   U^i;gh   U^gh;gh

, which captures the di¤erence between
the expected utility from the grand coalition and the expected utility of all players given a
two-agent coalition structure gh.
4 Coalition formation and equilibrium
4.1 O¤er-stability
Necessarily, coalitions that emerge must be stable in that no set of agents (or individual
agent) prefers to deviate and form a new coalition (or go o¤ on her own). We formalize
this requirement and introduce o¤er-stabilityas our coalition stability concept below. We
begin by dening feasible allocations of utility across agents for a given structure, X, where
the possible coalition structures are listed in Table 2.
Denition 1 (Allocation) An allocation A is a vector of utilities ui for each agent i 2
fs;m; `g. An allocation is feasible if Pi2lj ui = Pi2lj Ui;I + Ulj for each i given the
coalition structure, X.
A feasible allocation allows utility transfers within a coalition, but not across coalitions.
Transfers across coalitions imply a measure of cooperation across coalitions, which is incon-
sistent with our assumption that there are costs to forming coalitions that are borne by the
coalitions themselves.21
20The grand coalition has a net benet when U^G  
P
i U^i;I > 3, which we can rewrite as
2c(4+9k)2
9k2

U^G  
P
i U^i;I

> E3 or 
G
I > 
E
3 .
21Many lobbying organizations, such as the American Bankers Association (ABA), charge membership fees
and limit their membership. The limited membership direct the activities of the organization, including the
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Denition 2 (O¤er-stability) A feasible allocation-structure pair (A;X) is blocked if there
is a nonempty coalition in which each member is made weakly better o¤ and one member is
made strictly better o¤ in an alternative feasible allocation-structure pair (A0; X 0). A struc-
ture is o¤er-stable if, for every alternative feasible allocation-structure pair, (A0; X 0), with
X 0 6= X, there is an allocation-structure pair (A00; X) that is not blocked by (A0; X 0).
Our notion of o¤er-stability is based on the idea that if agent i considers leaving a
given coalition, then the remaining agents in the coalition could o¤er agent i any amount
up to the amount that those agents gain from being members of the coalition including
i. The logic extends naturally if we replace agent i with a set of agents. We use the
term o¤er-stability because it is based on the idea that coalitions can use countero¤ers to
prevent being blocked. Specically, A00 is a countero¤er that prevents X from being blocked
by an allocation-structure pair that includes an alternative structure, X 0. Our concept
of o¤er-stability is somewhat di¤erent from other coalition stability criteria as dened in
Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) and Aumann and Maschler (1964) (see also Ray and
Vohra, 2014). We contrast o¤er-stability with concepts of stability based on the core and
bargaining sets in Appendix B, where we also dene core-stability and provide a description
of stability based on bargaining sets.
To illustrate the notion of o¤er-stable coalitions, consider the grand coalition. If GI >
E3 , then the gain from forming the grand coalition, relative to not forming any coalition,
outweighs the costs. The grand coalition is then preferred to each agent lobbying indepen-
dently and the grand coalition is partially stable because agents i and k can o¤er up to
9k2(GI  E3 )
2c(4+9k)2
to agent i to prevent her from leaving. However, when 2 is not too large, two
members of the grand coalition might prefer to form a two-agent coalition over the grand
coalition. That is, it may be that the extra costs of having a three-agent coalition (relative
to a two-agent coalition) outweigh the benet. For example, with 2 = 0 and 
E
3 > 
G
I ,
a two-agent coalition may be optimal. Clearly, there are gains to be had from a two-agent
coalition, but we have not yet shown whether any two-agent coalition is o¤er-stable.
topics on which they lobby and the positions they endorse. The Chamber of Commerce also collects mem-
bership fees that pay for services that are meant to directly benet its members. For both the ABA and the
Chamber, there are potential lobbying spillovers (e.g., to other businesses or smaller nancial institutions).
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4.2 Coalition formation protocol and equilibrium denition
In this subsection we dene a protocol for coalition formation. In our setting, there is always
at least one o¤er-stable coalition. When there is more than one, our protocol provides for a
reasonable selection mechanism. Such protocols are common in cooperative games.22
Our protocol breaks the coalition-formation period (t = 0) into two subperiods, i and
ii. In the rst subperiod, the agents can come to the lobbyist and propose a coalition to be
formed. If an o¤er-stable coalition is proposed, the game proceeds to t = 1. If no coalition
is proposed in subperiod i, the lobbyist can make a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er to a set of agents
to form an o¤er-stable coalition in subperiod ii. For each region of the parameter space we
nd at least one o¤er-stable coalition. In regions with multiple o¤er-stable coalitions, our
protocol in which the lobbyist chooses allows for clean predictions. An equilibrium in our
model is dened as follows:
Denition 3 (Equilibrium) An equilibrium is dened as a septuple consisting of the coali-
tion structure, lobbying e¤orts, and regulatory policies,
n
X; B^i;j; ^i;j
o
, such that:
1. The regulator chooses optimal regulatory policies conditional on its objective function
and agentslobbying.
2. Agents choose optimal lobbying e¤orts conditional on the coalition structure and the
regulators anticipated strategy.
3. The coalition structure is determined following the protocol and consists of o¤er-stable
coalitions conditional on anticipated lobbying strategies and the regulators anticipated
strategy.
4.3 Coalition formation
An o¤er-stable two-agent coalition, as dened, cannot be broken up by the agent who is not
a member of the coalition. However, o¤er-stability implies that the outsiders utility in the
presence of a two-agent coalition is relevant for determining the surviving coalition. For this
22Ray and Vohra (1999), focusing on endogenous coalition formation, label some players as proposers, who
by proposing coalition structures and within-coalition transfers play essentially the same role as the lobbyist
here. Bloch (2002) similarly presents a sequential coalition formation game featuring proposers.
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reason, the agentsshare of coalition gains, , plays a role in determining o¤er stability. In
the following theorem, we develop the o¤er-stable coalition structures when agents keep a
su¢ ciently high fraction of the coalition gains,  > D`(Ds+Dm)
D2m+D
2
`
. For notational convenience,
let Gm` = 2D2 (Dm  D`)2 2
 
1 


Ds Dm` and Gs` = 2D2 (Ds  D`)2 2
 
1 


Dm Ds`.
These Gm` and 
G
s` terms capture e¤ective benets to the agents of forming the grand
coalition relative to being in the m` or s` coalition structure, respectively, much as the E
terms capture e¤ective coalition costs.
Theorem 1 When D`(Ds+Dm)
D2m+D
2
`
<   1,
1. E2  D2m`, and
(a) E3 > 
G
I , then no coalitions will form and all agents will lobby individually;
(b) E3  GI , then the o¤er-stable coalition structure consists of the grand lobby;
2. E2 2

D2s`; D
2
m`

, and
(a) E3   E2 > Gm`, then the o¤er-stable coalition structure consists of the m` lobby;
(b) E3   E2  Gm`, then the o¤er-stable coalition structure consists of the grand
lobby;
3. E2  D2s`, and
(a) E3   E2 > Gs`, then the o¤er-stable coalition structure consists of the s` lobby;
(b) E3  E2  Gs`, then the o¤er-stable coalition structure consists of the grand lobby.
Note that when the costs to forming a two-agent coalition are su¢ ciently low, E2  D2s`,
and the extra cost of forming the grand coalition is su¢ ciently large, then the only o¤er-
stable coalition is the s` lobby (part 3.a). Under these conditions, the m` lobby is not stable
because them agents gain from the s` lobby is relatively high. For that reason, the s agents
gain from joining the lobby exceeds the m agents loss from leaving the lobby and the s`
lobby persists. However, if E2 2

D2s`; D
2
m`

, then it is no longer protable for the s and `
agents to form a coalition together, as their net coalition gains are negative. For E2 in this
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region, the net coalition gains to the m` coalition are positive, implying that this coalition
is o¤er-stable when the negative coalition gains to s` make that coalition infeasible.
When  is not su¢ ciently high, i.e.,   D`(Ds+Dm)
D2m+D
2
`
, agents do not capture su¢ cient
gains from coalition formation to make them prefer to be inside the coalition rather than
outside. Recall that coalition membersnet gain is increasing in , while the benet to the
non-coalition participant, i.e., agent s in the presence of m`, is independent of . Similarly,
the gain to the grand coalition is increasing in , meaning that a lower  makes it less
desirable for the 2-agent coalition outsider to join the three-agent coalition.
Among two-agent coalitions, when  is too low, each agent prefers for the other two agents
to form a coalition. This arises due to the positive externalities that coalition formation have
on the non-coalition member, as shown by U^i;gh = U^i;I +
9k2Di Dgh
c(4+9k)2
. When each agent prefers
to be the outsider, the agents are in a sort of 3-way prisonersdilemma, in that each player
prefers to be the outsider in the presence of a two-agent coalition, but is worse o¤ if no
coalitions are formed at all. In such a standstill, any 2-agent coalition structure can form.
Once a two-agent coalition forms, it will be stable, as the outsider will not wish to make a
deviation-o¤er. However, prior to a two-agent coalition forming, no agent will willingly join
a coalition as long as the option to wait for a coalition that does not include them to form
remains.23 Given our protocol, the lobbyist emerges as an equilibrium selection mechanism:
if   D`(Ds+Dm)
D2m+D
2
`
, then the lobbyist chooses the coalition that is in her best interests in
sub-period b. As the coalition gain from the m` coalition is the largest, the lobbyist will
choose this coalition. Additionally, it may be that this is the only cost-e¤ective coalition.
Theorem 2 follows.
Theorem 2 When 0 <   D`(Ds+Dm)
D2m+D
2
`
,
1. E2 > D
2
m`, and
(a) E3 > 
G
I , then no coalitions will form and all agents will lobby individually;
23This is essentially a 3-way Mexican stando¤, wherein each player wants someone else to act (shoot) rst.
Laver and Shepsle (1990) discuss the issue of the Mexican stando¤ in the context of coalition governments.
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(b) E3  GI , then the o¤er-stable coalition structure consists of the grand lobby;
2. E2  D2m`, and
(a) E3   E2 > Gm`, then the o¤er-stable coalition structure consists of the m` lobby;
(b) E3   E2  Gm`, then the o¤er-stable coalition structure consists of the grand
lobby.
Essentially, inaction among agents with respect to forming two-agent coalitions eliminates
the possibility for the s` coalition to form.
We present the solution to the knife-edge case of  = 0 in Appendix A, directly following
the proofs to Theorems 1 and 2. The possible coalition structures with  = 0 are identical
to those with low  in Theorem 2. However, even though the lobbyist chooses the coalition
structure, the parameter values that lead to a particular coalition formation are slightly
di¤erent between the low  and  = 0 cases. The di¤erence is driven by the fact that the
s agent potentially benets from joining m and ` to form the grand coalition when  > 0,
but gains nothing when  = 0.
Figures 1(a) and 1(b) summarize Theorems 1 and 2 by mapping regions of coalitions as
functions of e¤ective coalition formation costs, E2 and 
E
3 . The area in the bottom-right is
not feasible, as it is dened by E2 > 
E
3 , 2 > 3. The remaining area, in the upper-left of
the gure, is divided into regions in which di¤erent coalition structures exist in equilibrium.
These regions correspond to the regions described in Theorems 1 and 2. Note that the areas
of the regions can change, but the shapes that dene the regions hold generally.
In addition to these regions, each gure features two rays that each start at a gray dot
and proceed up and to the right. These rays are useful for thinking about how the coalition
structure changes when k, c, or  change. Specically, each ray traces out the nexus of
points dened by E3 = 
E
2
3
2
for E2  18c2. Overall, the s determine the slope of the
ray, while c determines the point closest to the origin, and c and k jointly determine the
relevant point on the ray that denes the equilibrium coalition structure, i.e., where we fall
on the line segment. For a given c, the lowest and left-most point on the ray, at the gray
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Figure 1
Coalition structures as functions of e¤ective coalition-formation costs, E2 and 
E
3 . The grey line seg-
ment in each subgure indicates a nexus of points such that E3 = 
E
2
3
2
. The grey dot at the lower-
left end of each line segment is at (E2 ; 
E
3 ) = (18c2; 18c3). 
E
jlj j = jlj j
2c(4+9k)2
9k2 . On the verti-
cal axes, GI = 2

D2 +DsDm +DsD` +DmD`

, Gm` = 2D2   (Dm +D`)2   2
 
1 


DsDm`, and
Gm` = 2D
2   (Ds +D`)2   2
 
1 


DmDs`.
dot, is dened by the point
 
E2 ; 
E
3

= (18c2; 18c3), because limk!1
2c(4+9k)2
9k2
= 18c. If c
is very small, the gray dot is close to the origin, but if c is large, the gray dot is far. Large
values for the cost of lobbying, c, imply that e¤ective coalition costs are large because agents
do not lobby much. As c ! 0, the gray dot approaches the origin for any (2; 3) pair,
because low c implies extensive lobbying and high benets to forming the grand coalition.
Via the 2c(4+9k)
2
9k2
term in the Es, c and k can be thought of as determining the location on
the ray. Increasing k or decreasing c causes a shift down and to the left. Decreasing k or
increasing c, in contrast, cause shifts in the other direction.
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5 Analysis
5.1 Coalitions
When the lobbyist captures a su¢ cient amount of the net gains from coalition formation,
i.e., for   D`(Ds+Dm)
D2m+D
2
`
, the two possible equilibrium coalitions are m` and G. In either
coalition, agents group by similarity. That is, either no agents, the higher types, or all
agents form a coalition. This result is similar to much of the prior literature on endogenous
lobbying (e.g., Mitra, 1999), in which only the most similar agents organize into coalitions.
In contrast, when the agents capture a su¢ cient amount of the net gains from coalition
formation, i.e., with  > D`(Ds+Dm)
D2m+D
2
`
, the s` coalition is also possible. This resulting coalition
structure contrasts with much of the prior literature on endogenous lobbying, in which only
the most similar agents organize into coalitions, but is similar in spirit to the results of
Baccara and Yariv (2016), who nd potential for polarization or similarity of membership
in peer-selected groups organized to produce public goods. Our result is summarized in the
following proposition.
Proposition 1 Lobbyist power
If agents capture more of the net gains from coalition formation, i.e., as  increases, coali-
tions are weakly smaller and are more likely to be polarized, featuring dissimilar agents.
An increase in  indicates that the agentsshare of the net gains increases. As a com-
parison between Figures 1(a) and 1(b) shows, two transitions can occur when  crosses the
threshold D`(Ds+Dm)
D2m+D
2
`
. Specically, for 2 < D
2
s` and 
E
3  E2 > Gm`, low values of  lead to the
m` coalition. However, when  increases from below D`(Ds+Dm)
D2m+D
2
`
to above D`(Ds+Dm)
D2m+D
2
`
, the only
o¤er-stable coalition structure is s`. Similarly, when 2 < D
2
s` and 
G
s` < 
E
3   E2 < Gm`,
low values of  lead to the grand coalition whereas high values of  lead to the s` coalition.
For all other parameter values, changes in  do not have an e¤ect on the equilibrium coalition
structure.
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Next, we turn to the inuence of coalition costs, , the cost to agents of lobbying e¤orts,
c, and the degree of regulatory uniformity, k, on coalition formation, lobbying, B, and reg-
ulatory strength, . Several of the comparative statics below rely on transitions driven by
changes in parameters. These transitions can be understood graphically from Figure 1. Ad-
ditionally, we provide Figure 2. The edges indicate boundaries between coalition structures.
In the caption, we algebraically characterize the conditions under which parameter changes
lead to transitions across coalition structures and link these conditions to the labeled edges.
Proposition 2 Coalition costs
1. An increase in 3 causes weakly smaller lobbies.
2. An increase in 2 can cause lobbies to grow or to disband.
3. Concurrent proportional increases in 2 and 3 can lead to larger or smaller lobbies.
In Figures 1 and 2 an increase in 3 corresponds to an upward shift or a steepening of
the gray rays, which can cause a transition from the grand coalition to either the s` lobby
(edge 7), the m` lobby (edge 4), or to no lobby (edge 2). Not surprisingly, higher costs can
lead to smaller lobbies, as is always the case with the cost of the three-agent coalition, 3.
An increase in 2 corresponds to a rightward shift or a attening of the gray rays in Figures
1 and 2 (e.g., a transition from the dashed gray ray to the solid gray ray). Holding c and k
constant, this can cause the coalition shifts described in part 2 of Proposition 2 along edges
1, 3, 4, 5, 6, or 7. The m` coalition can become unstable with an increase in 2, causing a
transition either to the grand coalition or to no coalitions as E2 moves from below to above
D2` +D
2
m.
Graphically, a proportional increase in both 2 and 3 can be interpreted as a shift up
and to the right along any of the four gray rays in Figures 1. For example, in Figure 1(b)
(Figure 2), a shift up and to the right along the gray dashed line can cause transitions from G
to s` (edge 7), from s` to G (edge 6), from G to m` (edge 4), from m` to G (edge 3), or from
G to I (edge 2). Much of this non-monotonicity occurs because the non-coalition members
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Numerically labeled boundaries between coalition structures. On the vertical axes, GI =
2

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
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 
1 


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2   2   1  DmDs`. Ejlj j = jlj j 2c(4+9k)29k2 . Transitions between coalitions correspond to the
following: for E3 > 
G
I , decreasing 
E
2 from above to below D
2
m` yields a shift from I to m` (edge
1 ). For E2 > D
2
m`, decreasing 
E
3 from above to below 
G
I yields a shift from I to G (edge 2 ). For
GI > 
E
3 > 
G
m` + D
2
` + D
2
m, decreasing 
E
2 from above D
2
m` to below D
2
m` yields a shift from G to m`
(edge 3 ). For E2 2

D2s`; D
2
m`

, increasing E3 from below to above 
G
m` + 
E
2 or or decreasing 
E
2 from
above to below E3  Gm` yields a shift from G to m` (edge 4 ). The same transition occurs additionally,
for E2 < D
2
s` and   D`(Ds+Dm)D2m+D2` , when 
E
3 increases from below to above 
G
m` +
E
2 or when 
E
2 decreases
from above to below E3  Gm` (edge 4 ). For E3 > Gm` + E2 and  > D`(Ds+Dm)D2m+D2` , 
E
2 decreasing from
above D2s` to below D
2
s` yields a transition from m` to s` (edge 5 ). For 
G
s` + 
E
2 < 
E
3 < 
G
m` + 
E
2 , and
 > D`(Ds+Dm)
D2m+D
2
`
, decreasing E2 from above D
2
s` to below D
2
s` yields a transition from G to s` (edge 6 ).
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 > D`(Ds+Dm)
D2m+D
2
`
and E2 below D
2
s`, increasing 
E
3 from below to above 
G
s` + 
E
2 or decreasing 
E
2 from
above to below E3  Gs` yields a transition from G to s` (edge 7 ).
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utility is important for determining the o¤er-stable coalition. Specically, the non-coalition
member gains from the other agents forming a coalition (relative to the non-coalition case)
because the coalition members are able to overcome the free-rider problem and each agents
lobbying decreases all agentsregulatory strength. This externality of the two-agent lobby
can make it protable for one of the agents to leave the grand coalition.
Proposition 3 Lobbying costs and uniformity
Increases in lobbying costs, c, and decreases in regulatory uniformity, k, have similar e¤ects
as proportional increases in both coalition costs, 2 and 3, and can lead to larger or smaller
lobbies.
Note that 
E
3
3
=
E2
2
= 2c(4+9k)
2
9k2
, and that lobbying costs, c, and regulatory uniformity,
k, only inuence coalition structures through their inuence on E2 and 
E
3 . As such, any
change in c or k causes a proportional change in both E2 and 
E
3 , just as a proportional
change in both 2 and 3 would.
Graphically, lobbying costs, c, and regulatory uniformity, k, determine the relevant loca-
tion on a given E3 = 
E
2
3
2
ray; the particular gray lines in in Figure 1 are examples. First,
higher lobbying costs decrease the benet of lobbying, and thereby decrease the benets
from forming a coalition that helps overcome the free-rider problem on lobbying e¤ort. At
one extreme, as c ! 1, agents have no reason to form lobbies. At the other extreme, as
c ! 0, agents exert signicant lobbying e¤ort, making the grand coalition highly desirable.
At intermediate levels of c, increasing c causes a shift up and to the right along a given gray
ray, which can cause various transitions between coalition structures.
Increases in regulatory uniformity, k, exacerbate the free-rider problem on lobbying and,
thus, tend to promote the formation of lobbies. When k is very low, the lobbying externalities
are insignicant, giving agents little incentive to bear the costs of forming coalitions. Note
that limk!0 Ej ! 1 which corresponds to locations on the gray rays in Figure 1 that are
in the No Lobbiesregion. Increasing k causes a shift down and to the left along a given
ray. When k is su¢ ciently high, agents can benet from coordinating their lobbying e¤orts,
which tends to favor larger lobbies, but can locally cause transitions to smaller lobbies as
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well. Even with high k, though, lobbying can be too costly for coalition formation to be
benecial.
5.2 Lobbying activity and regulatory strength
We turn to the e¤ects of parameter changes on lobbying e¤orts and regulatory strength.
Corollary 1 Lobbyist power
An increase in the fraction of the net gains from coalition formation that are retained by the
agents, i.e., higher , causes weakly lower lobbying, B, higher regulatory strength, , and
lower expected welfare losses from agentsprivately benecial activities.
As described in Proposition 1, and illustrated in comparisons between Figures 1(a) and
1(b), higher  makes the s` coalition feasible in regions of parameter-space that would
otherwise be characterized by either the m` coalition or the grand coalition. Higher  in
these regions thus leads to smaller coalitions that pursue less total lobbying, which lessens the
agentsinuence on equilibrium regulatory strength, allowing the regulator to set stronger
policies, i.e., higher . This in turn deters the privately benecial action more frequently,
lowering the expected welfare losses.
Similar to , changes in 2 and 3 only a¤ect lobbying e¤orts and regulatory strengths
through their e¤ects on the equilibrium coalition structure. These are discussed next.
Changes in c and k, discussed below, a¤ect lobbying and regulatory strength both directly
(through agentschoice of lobbying and the regulators choice of regulatory strength condi-
tional on coalition structure) and indirectly (through their e¤ects on the endogenous coalition
structures).
Corollary 2 Coalition costs
1. An increase in 3, all else equal, causes weakly lower lobbying, B, higher regulatory
strength, , and lower expected welfare losses from agentsprivately benecial activities.
2. An increase in 2, all else equal, can cause either weakly lower lobbying, B, higher
regulatory strength, , and lower expected losses from diversion; or greater lobbying, B,
lower regulatory strength, , and greater expected welfare losses from agentsprivately
benecial activities.
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Corollary 2 arises from the results in Proposition 2 and because larger coalitions lobby
more. More lobbying in turn weakens regulation and increases agentschances to ine¢ ciently
take the privately benecial actions. Coalition formation costs inuence lobbying and reg-
ulatory strength indirectly, that is, only through their inuence on the coalition structure.
In a regression of total lobbying on formation costs and observed coalition structures, for
instance, formation costs should have no explanatory power because their explanatory power
is completely subsumed by the coalition structures that emerge.
As noted above, unlike coalition formation costs, both lobbying costs and regulatory
uniformity have direct e¤ects on equilibrium lobbying behavior and regulatory strengths.
In fact, as shown in Friedman and Heinle (2016), absent lobbying coalitions, k and c have
monotonic e¤ects on lobbying and regulatory strength. Absent coalitions, more regulatory
uniformity and higher lobbying costs both lead to less lobbying and stronger regulatory
policies, all else equal. In the presence of endogenously-formed coalitions, both regulatory
uniformity and lobbying costs inuence whether and which agents organize into lobbying
coalitions, causing the e¤ects of c and k to be non-monotonic.
Corollary 3 Lobbying costs and uniformity
An increase in lobbying costs, c, or regulatory uniformity, k, all else equal, can cause either
weakly lower lobbying, B, and higher regulatory strength, ; or greater lobbying, B, and lower
regulatory strength, .
Corollary 3 combines the results of Proposition 3 with the monotonic e¤ects of lobbying
costs and regulatory uniformity shown in Friedman and Heinle (2016). The results described
in Corollary 3 are illustrated in Figure 3, which plots total lobbying, B, and average reg-
ulatory strength, ave = 1
3
P
i, as functions of regulatory uniformity, k, for two sets of
parameters that di¤er only in 2. The solid gray curves have 2 = 1, while the dashed black
curves have 2 = 2. In both cases, 3 = 2:65.
24
When 2 = 2, coalition formation costs are concave, corresponding to a relatively at
E3 = 
E
2
3
2
solid ray in Figure 1(b) and the solid plots in Figure 3. Starting from k = 0,
24Other parameters are set as  = 1, Ds = 1, Dm = 15, D` = 30, c = 1, and  = 1:2.
30
0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10
k
Total Lobbying
a) Lobbying 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10
k
Average π
b) Average π(a) Total Lobbying0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10
k
Total Lobbying
a) Lobbying 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10
k
Average π
b) Average π(b) Average Regulatory Strength
Figure 3
Total lobbying and average regulatory strength as functions of regulatory uniformity, k, when  >
D`(Ds+Dm)
D2m+D
2
`
. Parameters are set as  = 1, Ds = 1, Dm = 15, D` = 30, 3 = 2:65, c = 1, and  = 1:2. For
the solid gray line, 2 = 1. For the dotted black line, 2 = 2.
increasing k tends to reduce lobbying and increase regulatory strength. These continue
monotonically in k until we reach a threshold level of k that makes the benet of forming a
three-agent coalition su¢ ciently large (edge 2 in Figure 2). At this point, as the coalition is
formed, we see a discrete jump in total lobbying and a drop in average regulatory strength.
Further increases in regulatory uniformity have no more e¤ects, as k is moot in the presence
of the grand coalition and increases in k maintain the dominance of the grand coalition.
When 2 = 1, coalition costs are convex, corresponding to a steeper 
E
3 = 
E
2
3
2
dashed
ray in Figure 1(b) and the dashed plots in Figure 3. Total lobbying and average regulatory
strength mostly behave as they do when coalition costs are concave. There is, however, a
key di¤erence in the intermediate range of k 2 (0:06; 0:08). In this region, as we increase
k from 0:06, we rst see a transition from the grand coalition to the m` coalition around
k = 0:061. This rst transition occurs when the m` coalition becomes feasible, as E2 drops
below D2` +D
2
m (edge 3 in Figure 2(b)). As k continues to increase, the m` coalition remains
optimal, but total lobbying decreases and average regulatory strength increase, as the free-
rider problem between the m` coalition and agent s worsen. As k increases past about 0:07,
E3 becomes less than 
E
2 + 2D
2  D2m` + DmD`, and, as the gain from the grand coalition
starts to dominate the gain from the m` coalition, we see a shift back to the high lobbying
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and low regulatory strength associated with the grand coalition (edge 4). (Recall that when
costs are convex, E3 will decrease faster in k than 
E
2 will.) Next, as k increases further, the
s` coalition becomes feasible with E2 dipping below D
2
` +D
2
s . At k  0:074, the s` coalition
is preferable to the grand coalition (edge 6), but at k  0:076, the grand coalition again
becomes preferable, as E3 drops below 
E
2 + 2D
2  D2s` + DsD` (edge 7). With k between
0:074 and 0:076, increases in regulatory uniformity again cause decreases in lobbying and
increases in regulatory strength, as the free-rider problem between the s` coalition and agent
m gets worse. As k increases beyond 0:076, the grand coalition is again optimal, and further
increases in regulatory uniformity cease to play a signicant role.
Results, though not plotted, are similar for changes in lobbying costs, c, as increases in
c have similar e¤ects as decreases in k as described in Proposition 3 and Corollary 3 and
illustrated graphically with shifts along the gray rays in Figures 1(a) and 1(b). Figure 3
shows that increases in k have non-monotonic e¤ects on lobbying and regulatory strength
when agents can organize into lobbies to overcome free-rider problems on lobbying. Almost
everywhere, the e¤ects of k on lobbying (regulatory strength) are locally negative (positive),
but these e¤ects can be signicantly outweighed by discrete jumps or drops as changes in k
cause agents to change how they organize into coalitions.
6 Discussion and implications
In this section we relate our results to our motivating example of the regulation of nancial
institutions. Our main results relate to the interactions between regulatory uniformity,
coalition formation, and lobbying. Existing evidence on coalition formation is sparse, so
our empirical implications come mainly as suggestions for potential studies rather than
interpretations of existing evidence.25
Overall, empirical studies related to the results of our model require proxies for the cen-
tral constructs. For lobbying costs and changes in lobbying costs, we recommend: judicial
25An exception is Bombardini and Trebbi (2012), discussed in footnote 7.
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decisions that changes how easily money can be raised and channeled to politicians (e.g.,
the Citizens United case that paved the way for corporate Political Action Committees);
policies a¤ecting how quickly a regulator can take a job in a related industry (i.e., revolving
doorstops); the extensiveness of requirements for lobbying expenditure disclosures; campaign
nance rules and reforms (e.g., the 2002 McCain-Feingold Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act);
and anti-corruption rules that can limit de facto inuence activities (e.g., the Foreign Cor-
rupt Practices Act and its 1998 and 1998 amendments). To capture lobby membership,
researchers can hand-collect membership rolls of active lobbying groups and trade associa-
tions, such as the Financial Services Roundtable (FSR) and American Bankers Association
(ABA), or exploit overlapping lobbyists. Specically, rms that hire or employ the same
lobbyist might be considered members of a lobbyist-facilitated coalition. Data on which lob-
bying rms work for which rms is available in federal forms collected and disseminated by
the Center for Responsive Politics (CRP). Lobbying activities can include both expenditures
captured in the CRP data as well as non-pecuniary inuence activities, such as meetings
with regulators, which are often logged by the regulators.26 Finally, proxies for regulatory
uniformity could depend on the degree of regulatory responsibilities at higher levels in a
regulatory hierarchy (e.g., at the ECB versus country-level central banks), whether a set
of rms are overseen by the same regulator or o¢ ce, and whether rms fall into the same
characteristic-based buckets (e.g., which side of the $50 billion Dodd-Frank cuto¤). O¢ ce
closures (Gopalan et al., 2017), regulatory consolidation (Granja and Leuz, 2017; Wong,
2018), alternating supervisory responsibilities (Agarwal et al., 2014), and legislative changes
to prudential thresholds (Ackerman, 2018) each provide specic examples of shocks to reg-
ulatory uniformity that we expect would a¤ect incentives to form coalitions and inuence
regulators.
Within a given set of policies, there may also be considerable variation in the degree
of uniformity. Minimum capital requirements may be applied to rms uniformly, while
26Logs of Fed meetings, including attendees, dates, and summaries of the topics discussed are available
from the Feds website at https://www.federalreserve.gov/regreform/communications-with-public.htm.
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rm-specic stress tests could be applied with signicant heterogeneity. We might therefore
expect large bank lobbies, like the ABA, to focus more on capital requirements, while rms
individualized lobbying might focus more on individualized stress testing.
As an example, in 2006, the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 was amended to require
that lobbyists register with congressional o¢ cials. Arguably, this registration requirement
imposes a cost on becoming a lobbyist and, thus, creates a barrier to entry that restricts the
supply of lobbyists. We expect that the 2006 amendment of the Lobbying Disclosure Act has
increased the bargaining power of the remaining lobbyists. In our model, this translates into
a reduction in . Our model (Proposition 1 and Corollary 1) predicts that following the 2006
amendment, lobbying coalitions are more likely to be formed by larger nancial institutions
and that total lobbying should increases as a result. Consistent with this prediction, in the
1998 to 2016 period, the number of unique registered lobbyists who have actively lobbied
on behalf of the Finance, Insurance & Real Estate sector peaked in 2007 and has steadily
decreased every year since, with the exception of a slight uptick in 2013. During the same
period, the total lobbying spending by rms in the Finance, Insurance & Real Estate sector
increased each year from 2008 to 2016, with the exception of a slight reduction in 2015.
While our prediction is consistent with the secular trend, empirical studies could examine
whether explicit and implicit coalition structures changed around the 2006 amendment and
other shocks to lobbyistsbargaining power (e.g., Bertrand et al., 2014).
The 2008 to 2016 period has also seen an increase in the prevalence of lobbying coali-
tions, as highlighted in the popular press (e.g., Bogardus, 2013; Ho, 2015), and the dollar
amount of political contributions, particularly soft money contributions, made by the nan-
cial sector. These trends are consistent with the potential e¤ects of changes in lobbying costs
and regulatory uniformity brought about by recent changes in the institutional environment
introduced by the Supreme Court and Congress. Ho (2015) provides examples of coalitions
featuring both similar and dissimilar members.
Turning to regulatory uniformity, Title 1 of Dodd-Frank established the Financial Sta-
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bility Oversight Council as a coordinator of the oversight and regulation of systemically
important nancial institutions. Additionally, Section 312 of the Dodd-Frank Act specied
that the O¢ ce of Thrift Supervision be closed down and its oversight responsibilities re-
allocated to the Federal Reserve, FDIC, and OCC. Both changes tend towards regulatory
policies that treat nancial large nancial institutions with a great degree of homogeneity
and di¤erences in treatment between large and small banks. Potentially in response to this
change in regulatory uniformity, the FSR recently announced a reduction in its membership
to focus more on issues a¤ecting the largest banks.27 This is consistent with our models
prediction (Proposition 3) that decreased uniformity across types of banks can lead to the
splintering of coalitions.
Overall, one of the main messages of our paper is that changes in the underlying parame-
ters that a¤ect the coalition structure can go in the opposite direction of changes that do not
a¤ect the coalition structure. Empirical analyses of lobbying and regulatory outcomes might
nd no e¤ects for uniformity or muted e¤ects for changes in lobbying costs if coalition e¤ects
are ignored. Observing coalition e¤ects in the data requires measuring coalition structures
and examining whether these change around shocks to underlying parameters of interest.
For instance, a small increase in uniformity might lead to a reduction in lobbying, while a
further increase in uniformity might lead to an increase in lobbying because a new coalition
formed.
7 Conclusion
In this study we investigate the propensity of agents to form coalitions that lobby against
stricter policies. For example, nancial rms can take privately-benecial actions that impose
systemic risks on the nancial system and lobby against policies that reduce their ability
27Specically, the FSR board recently voted to limit its membership to banks with more than $25B in
assets and very large payments companies (e.g., MasterCard and Visa). This restructuring led to a more
homogeneous set of members via the exclusion of smaller nancial institutions, insurers, and asset managers
(Guida, 2018). The FSR also recently merged with the policy arm of The Clearing House, another large
bank coalition (Clozel, 2018).
35
to take such actions. In our model, agents form coalitions because regulation is, at least
partly, uniform across agents. This uniformity, in turn, implies that one agents lobbying
has e¤ects on all other agentsregulation, such that a free-rider problem on lobbying arises
among agents. The benet to forming coalitions emerges because we assume that agents
within a coalition are able to overcome the free-rider problem, which increases the lobbying
e¤orts of all agents in the coalition. As the free-rider problem is caused by uniformity, a
more uniform regulatory policy increases the benets to forming a lobbying coalition.
We assume that a lobbyist is necessary to form a coalition, and allow the lobbyists
bargaining power, i.e., the fraction of the net coalition benet she extracts, to vary. In
this setting, the degree of lobbyist power inuences the potential lobbies that can arise in
equilibrium, with dissimilar agents potentially joining together only when agents retain a high
fraction of the net coalition gains. We further nd that endogenous coalition formation causes
the e¤ects of regulatory uniformity and lobbying costs on total lobbying and average policy
strength to be non-monotonic. Increasing the degree of uniformity both: (i) increases the
free-rider problem, which decreases lobbying and increases average policy strength; and (ii),
increases the benet of forming coalitions, which increases lobbying and decreases average
policy strength. In an environment with a xed coalition structure, only the rst e¤ect is
present. However, since the coalition structure reacts to changes in policy uniformity, we nd
non-monotonic e¤ects of increasing the extent of uniformity. Similarly, increasing the cost
agents bear personally for lobbying has a direct e¤ect that decreases lobbying but has an
indirect e¤ect on the benet of forming a lobby. Surprisingly, we nd that lobbying decreases
(and regulatory quality increases) when competition in the lobbyist market increases. The
reason is that when agents retain a higher share of the benets to forming coalitions, they
tend to form smaller coalitions which results in less lobbying. As a result, increasing barriers
to entry in the lobbyist market, e.g., through anti-revolving-door policies, can lead to more
lobbying for policies that benet private interests.
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8 Appendix A
8.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Independent agents. When the three agents act independently, lobbying, regulatory
strengths, and agentsutility are given by
B^i;I =
4 + 3k
c (4 + 9k)
Di, (8)
^i;I =
c (4 + 9k)  (4 + 3k)
c (4 + 9k)2
 
4Di + 3k D

, and (9)
U^i;I = (1  ^i;I)Di   1
2c

4 + 3k
4 + 9k
2
D2i . (10)
Two-agent lobbies. We rst characterize the results for all possible two-agent lobbies and
then summarize them using generic notation.
Small-medium agent coalition: When the small (s) and medium (m) agents form a lobby
together, lobbying is as follows:
B^s;sm = B^s;I +
3kDm
c (4 + 9k)
=
4Ds + 3k Dsm
c (4 + 9k)
,
B^m;sm = B^m;I +
3kDs
c (4 + 9k)
=
4Dm + 3k Dsm
c (4 + 9k)
,
B^`;sm = B^`;I = D`
4 + 3k
c (4 + 9k)
, and
Bsm = B^I +
3k Dsm
c (4 + 9k)
,
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where Dsm = Dm +Ds. Regulatory strengths are:
^s;sm =
4

Ds   B^s;I   3kDmc(4+9k)

+ 3k

 D   B^I   3k Dsmc(4+9k)

4 + 9k
= ^s;I  
3k
 
4Dm + 3k Dsm

c (4 + 9k)2
,
^m;sm = ^m;I  
3k
 
4Ds + 3k Dsm

c (4 + 9k)2
, and
^`;sm = ^`;I   9k
2 Dsm
c (4 + 9k)2
.
The utilities are:
U^sm;sm =
c(9k + 4)

(9k + 4) Dsm   

3k Dsm D + 4D2sm

+ 3k Dsm D (3k + 4) + 8D2sm
c(9k + 4)2
= U^s;I + U^m;I +
9k2D2sm
2c (4 + 9k)2
and
U`;sm =
D`
 
4D`  4  2c(9k + 4)(3k( D   3)) +D`(3k + 4)2 + 12k(3k + 2) Dsm

2c(9k + 4)2
= U^`;I +
9k2D` Dsm
c (4 + 9k)2
,
where D2sm = D
2
s +D
2
m.
Small-large agent coalition: When the small (s) and large (`) agents form a lobby together,
lobbying is as follows:
B^s;s` = B^s;I +
3kD`
c (4 + 9k)
=
4Ds + 3k Ds`
c (4 + 9k)
,
B^m;s` = B^m;I = Dm
4 + 3k
c (4 + 9k)
,
B^`;s` = B^`;I +
3kDs
c (4 + 9k)
=
4D` + 3k Ds`
c (4 + 9k)
, and
Bsm = B^I +
3k Ds`
c (4 + 9k)
,
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where Ds` = Ds +D`. Regulatory strengths are:
^s;s` = ^s;I  
3k
 
4D` + 3k Ds`

c (4 + 9k)2
,
^m;s` = ^m;I   9k
2 Ds`
c (4 + 9k)2
, and
^`;s` = ^`;I  
3k
 
4Ds + 3k Ds`

c (4 + 9k)2
,
and utilities are:
U^s`;s` =
c(9k + 4)

(9k + 4) Ds`   

4D2s` + 3k
Ds` D

+ 8D2s` + 3k
Ds` D (3k + 4)
c(9k + 4)2
= U^s;I + U^`;I +
9k2D2s`
2c (4 + 9k)2
and
U^m;s` =
Dm
  2c(9k + 4)(3k( D   3) + 4Dm  4) + 12k(3k + 2) Ds` +Dm(3k + 4)2
2c(9k + 4)2
= U^m;I +
9k2Dm Ds`
c (4 + 9k)2
,
where D2s` = D
2
s +D
2
` .
Medium-large agent coalition: When the medium (m) and large (`) agents form a lobby
together, lobbying is as follows:
B^s;m` = B^s;I = Ds
4 + 3k
c (4 + 9k)
,
B^m;m` = B^m;I +
3kD`
c (4 + 9k)
=
4Dm + 3k Dm`
c (4 + 9k)
,
B^`;m` = B^`;I +
3kDm
c (4 + 9k)
=
4D` + 3k Dm`
c (4 + 9k)
, and
Bsm = B^I +
3k Dm`
c (4 + 9k)
,
43
where Dm` = Dm +D`. Regulatory strengths are:
^s;m` = ^s;I   9k
2 Dm`
c (4 + 9k)2
,
^m;m` = ^m;I  
3k
 
4D` + 3k Dm`

c (4 + 9k)2
, and
^`;m` = ^`;I  
3k
 
4Dm + 3k Dm`

c (4 + 9k)2
,
and utilities are:
U^m`;m` =
c(9k + 4)

(9k + 4) Dm`   

4D2m` + 3k
Dm` D

+ 8D2m` + 3k
Dm` D (3k + 4)
c(9k + 4)2
= U^m;I + U^`;I +
9k2D2m`
2c (4 + 9k)2
and
U^s;m` =
Ds
  2c(9k + 4)(3k( D   3) + 4Ds  4) + 12k(3k + 2) Dm` +Ds(3k + 4)2
2c(9k + 4)2
= U^s;I +
9k2Ds Dm`
c (4 + 9k)2
,
where D2m` = D
2
m +D
2
` .
Generic Notation: Generally, in the two-agent setting, if agents g and h form a lobby or
coalition, leaving agent i out, we have the following: B^i;gh = B^i;I = Di 4+3kc(4+9k) ; B^g;gh =
B^g;I +
3kDh
c(4+9k)
=
4Dg+3k Dgh
c(4+9k)
; and Bgh = B^I +
3k Dgh
c(4+9k)
. Regulatory strengths are: ^i;gh =
^i;I  9k
2 Dgh
c(4+9k)2
and ^g;gh = ^g;I  3k(4Dh+3k
Dgh)
c(4+9k)2
. The coalitionsexpected utilities are: U^gh;gh =
U^g;I + U^h;I +
9k2D2gh
2c(4+9k)2
and U^i;gh = U^i;I +
9k2Di Dgh
c(4+9k)2
, where and U^gh;gh is the total utility of the
agents and the lobbyist in the gh coalition. Note that U^i;gh  U^i;I , implying that the non-
coalition member benets from the other agents forming a coalition.
Grand coalition/three-agent lobby. When all agents join together in the three-agent
lobby (the grand coalition), lobbying is B^i;G = 4Di+3k
D
c(4+9k)
for each agent, which implies that
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total lobbying is given by BG =
D
c
. Regulatory strengths are:
^i;G =
4Di

  4
c(4+9k)

+ 3k D

  1
c
  4
c(4+9k)

4 + 9k
(11)
and the total expected utility of the grand coalition is
U^G = U^s;I + U^m;I + U^`;I +
9k2

D2 +DsDm +DsD` +DmD`

c (4 + 9k)2
. (12)
8.2 Proof of Theorems 1 and 2: O¤er-stable coalitions
To help develop coalition stability among two-agent coalitions, we dene a maximum devi-
ation o¤er.
Denition 4 (Two-agent maximum deviation o¤er) If agents g and h are members
of the gh coalition, the maximum deviation o¤er from agent i to agent g, MDOghi;g is the
greatest amount that agent i would o¤er agent g to leave the gh coalition and join the new
ig coalition.
We can calculate the maximum deviation o¤ers that a given agent is willing to make as
MDOghi;g = U^i;ig + U^g;ig   U^L;ig   U^i;gh (13)
= U^i;I + U^g;I + 
 
9k2D2ig
2c (4 + 9k)2
  2
!
 

U^i;I +
9k2Di Dgh
c (4 + 9k)2

(14)
= U^g;I +
9k2



D2ig   2

 Di Dgh

2c (4 + 9k)2
, (15)
which is the utility that the agents in the ig coalition achieve minus the utility that agent i
expects to achieve in the presence of the gh coalition. The MDOghi;g is the maximum o¤er,
because agent i in coalition ig faces a budget constraint (in terms of transferable utility)
of U^i;ig + U^g;ig   U^L;ig. Furthermore, agent is outside option is to remain independent in a
structure featuring the gh coalition, meaning that she should be willing to o¤er agent g no
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more than the gain achieved from gs deviation from gh to ig. For example,
MDOm`s;` = U^`;I +
9k2
2c (4 + 9k)2



D2s`   2

  2Ds Dm`

and (16)
MDOs`m;` = U^`;I +
9k2
2c (4 + 9k)2



D2m`   2

  2Dm Ds`

. (17)
The following denition illustrates the o¤er-stability concept within the set of two-agent
coalitions.
Lemma 2 (O¤er stability for a two-agent coalition) A two-agent coalition gh is o¤er-
stable relative to other two-agent coalitions if MDOghi;g < MDO
gi
h;g and MDO
gh
i;h < MDO
hi
g;h,
i.e., if: 1) agent is maximum deviation o¤er to g conditional on coalition gh is lower than
agent hs maximum deviation o¤er to g conditional on coalition ig; and 2) agent is max-
imum deviation o¤er to h conditional on coalition gh is lower than agent gs maximum
deviation o¤er to h conditional on coalition ih. A coalition structure containing a stable
two-agent coalition is two-agent stable.
Lemma 2 allows us to prove Theorems 1 and 2. First, MDOsms;` > MDO
s`
m;`:
MDOm`s;` > MDO
s`
m;`
D2s + D
2
`   2DsDm   2DsD` > D2m + D2`   2DmDs   2DmD`
2DmD`   2DsD` > D2m   D2s
2D` (Dm  Ds) >  (Dm +Ds) (Dm  Ds)
2D` >  (Dm +Ds) ,
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which implies that agent s can make a credible o¤er to agent ` to leave the m` coalition.
Note that the 2 terms on both sides cancel. Second, MDO
sm
`;s > MDO
s`
m;s:
MDOsm`;s > MDO
s`
m;s
U^s;I +
9k2

D2`s   2D` Dms

2c (4 + 9k)2
> U^s;I +
9k2

D2ms   2Dm D`s

2c (4 + 9k)2
D2` + D
2
s   2D` (Dm +Ds) > D2s + D2m   2Dm (D` +Ds)
 (D` +Dm) > 2Ds,
which is true for  > 2Ds
D`+Dm
, and false for  < 2Ds
D`+Dm
. When  < 2Ds
D`+Dm
, MDOsm`;s <
MDOs`m;s, implying that agentm can make a credible o¤er to agent s to leave the s` coalition.
Finally,
MDOsm`;m > MDO
m`
s;m ,
U^m;I +
9k2

D2m`   2D` Dms

2c (4 + 9k)2
> U^m;I +
9k2

D2sm   2Ds Dm`

2c (4 + 9k)2
,
 (D` +Ds) > 2Dm.
So,  > 2Dm
D`+Ds
)MDOsm`;m > MDOm`s;m, implying that ` can successfully motivate m to leave
the sm coalition. But  < 2Dm
D`+Dm
)MDOsm`;m < MDOm`s;m, implying that s can successfully
motivate m to leave the m` coalition.
Comparing the thresholds, we have
2Ds
D` +Dm
<
2Dm
D` +Ds
2Ds (D` +Ds) < 2Dm (D` +Dm)
2DsD` + 2D
2
s < 2DmD` + 2D
2
m.
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If  > 2Dm
D`+Ds
, then  > 2Ds(Dm+D`)
D2`+D
2
s
, as
2Dm
D` +Ds
>
2Ds (Dm +D`)
D2` +D
2
s
2DmD
2
` + 2DmD
2
s + 4DmD`Ds > 2D
2
sD` + 2DmD
2
s + 2DsD
2
` + 2DmDsD`
D2` (Dm  Ds) +D`Ds (Dm  Ds) > 0.
If  > 2Dm
D`+Ds
, then  > 2Dm(Ds+D`)
D2m+D
2
`
may or may not be true, as
2Dm
D` +Ds
>
2Dm (Ds +D`)
D2m +D
2
`
2Dm
 
D2m +D
2
`

> 2Dm (Ds +D`)
2
D2m +D
2
` > D
2
s +D
2
` + 2DsD`
Dm +Ds
Ds +Ds
(Dm  Ds) > D`.
Overall, we have the following for regions of parameter-space dened by :
1.  > 2Dm
D`+Ds
) MDOm`s;` > MDOs`m;`, MDOsm`;s > MDOs`m;s, and MDOsm`;m > MDOm`s;m.
s` is o¤er-stable.
2. 2Ds
D`+Dm
<  < 2Dm
D`+Ds
) MDOm`s;` > MDOs`m;`, MDOsm`;s > MDOs`m;s, and MDOsm`;m <
MDOm`s;m. s` is o¤er-stable.
3.  < 2Ds
D`+Dm
) MDOm`s;` > MDOs`m;`, MDOsm`;s < MDOs`m;s, and MDOsm`;m < MDOm`s;m.
sm is hypothetically o¤er-stable.
In the following subsections we derive coalition structures in each region of the parameter-
space.
8.2.1 2 < D2s`
If MDOm`s;` > 0, then the s agent is better-o¤ in a pairing with ` than as the outsider when
m` form. To be able to form a pairing with `, s must be able to o¤er ` more than what `
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would gain from being the outsider in the presence of the sm lobby, meaning 

D2`s   2

 
2D` Dsm > 0,  > 2D`(Ds+Dm)D2`+D2s 2 , which in turn implies
 >
2D` (Ds +Dm)
D2` +D
2
s   2
)   D2` +D2s + 2DsD`  2 > 2D`Ds (1 + ) + 2D`Dm
)  (D` +Ds) (D` +Ds)  2 > +2D`Dm + 2DmDs + 2D`Ds (1 + )  2DmDs
)  > 2Dm
D` +Ds
+
2Ds (D`  Dm) + 2D`Ds + 2
(D` +Ds)
2 >
2Dm
D` +Ds
)  > 2Dm
D` +Ds
.
It is possible, that for  < 2D`(Ds+Dm)
D2`+D
2
s 2 , the ` agent will turn down the s-agents o¤er to form
a coalition, preferring to wait for the sm coalition to form or willing to form an m` coalition.
The ` agent will prefer to form a coalition with m rather than waiting for the sm coalition
to potentially form if
 >
2D` (Ds +Dm)
D2m +D
2
`   2
.
So, if  2

2D`(Ds+Dm)
D2m+D
2
` 2
; 2D`(Ds+Dm)
D2`+D
2
s 2

, then the ` agent will be willing to form an m` coalition
but unwilling to form an s` coalition. In this range, the m agent will be willing to form the
coalition with ` rather than wait as long as
 >
2Dm (Ds +D`)
D2m +D
2
`   2
,
which is implied by  > 2D`(Ds+Dm)
D2m+D
2
` 2
as 2D`(Ds+Dm)
D2m+D
2
` 2
> 2Dm(Ds+D`)
D2m+D
2
` 2
. For  2

2D`(Ds+Dm)
D2m+D
2
` 2
; 2D`(Ds+Dm)
D2`+D
2
s 2

,
 > 2Ds
D`+Dm
is true and implies that s` is o¤er-stable. So, s can make a successful deviation
o¤er to ` to leave the m` coalition. The problem is that ` would rather be the outsider in
the presence of the sm coalition than be in the s` coalition, but would rather be in the m`
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coalition than be the outsider. This means that the following hold:
MDOsm`;s < 0,
MDOsm`;m > 0, and
MDOm`s;` > MDO
s`
m;` > 0.
So, this arrangement should result in the s` lobby forming as well, via the following sequence:
1) m forms a coalition with `; 2) s makes a successful deviation-o¤er to `.
If  < 2D`(Ds+Dm)
D2m+D
2
` 2
(i.e., MDOsm`;m), then the ` agent will prefer to wait rather than join
a coalition with s or m. In this case, the sm coalition will emerge if s and m both prefer
joining the coalition to waiting, i.e., if
 >
2Ds (Dm +D`)
D2s +D
2
m   2
and  >
2Dm (Ds +D`)
D2s +D
2
m   2
Now,  > 2Dm(Ds+D`)
D2s+D
2
m 2 )  >
2Ds(Dm+D`)
D2s+D
2
m 2 , so we can focus only on the  >
2Dm(Ds+D`)
D2s+D
2
m 2
condition. It is not possible to have  2

2Dm(Ds+D`)
D2s+D
2
m 2 ;
2D`(Ds+Dm)
D2m+D
2
` 2

, i.e., this range is empty,
as 2Dm(Ds+D`)
D2s+D
2
m 2 >
2D`(Ds+Dm)
D2m+D
2
` 2
. To show this, let Dm = Ds + dm and D` = Ds + dm + d` with
d` > 0 and dm > 0. Then
2Dm(Ds+D`)
D2s+D
2
m 2 <
2D`(Ds+Dm)
D2m+D
2
` 2
implies
2 (Ds + dm) (Ds +Ds + d`)
 
(Ds + dm)
2 + (Ds + d`)
2   2

< 2 (Ds + d`) (Ds +Ds + dm)
 
D2s + (Ds + dm)
2   2

) 0 > 2 (Ds + dm) (Ds +Ds + dm + d`)
 
(Ds + dm)
2 + (Ds + dm + d`)
2   2

 2 (Ds + dm + d`) (Ds +Ds + dm)
 
D2s + (Ds + dm)
2   2

) 0 > 2
0B@ 5Dsd3m + 4D3sdm +Dsd3` + 2D3sd` + dmd3` + 3d3md` + d4m + 8D2sd2m
+4D2sd
2
` + 3d
2
md
2
` + 7Dsdmd
2
` + 10Dsd
2
md` + 10D
2
sdmd` + 2Dsd`
1CA .
Therefore, the m agent will prefer to wait rather than join with s. So, for  < 2D`(Ds+Dm)
D2m+D
2
` 2
,
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neither them nor ` agents are willing to join a coalition and we have a standstill. Overall, for
 > D`(Ds+Dm)
D2m+D
2
`
, we should see the o¤er-stable s` coalition. For  < D`(Ds+Dm)
D2m+D
2
`
, the lobbyist
will choose the m` coalition.
When  > D`(Ds+Dm)
D2m+D
2
`
and 2 < D
2
s`, the agents will rationally form a 3-agent lobby if
U^G   3  U^s`;s`   2 + U^m;s`

0@9k2

D2 +DsDm +DsD` +DmD`

c (4 + 9k)2
  3
1A   9k2D2s`
2c (4 + 9k)2
  2
!
+
9k2Dm Ds`
c (4 + 9k)2
2D2   (Ds  D`)2   2

1  


Dm Ds`  2c (4 + 9k)
2
9k2
(3   2)
2D2   (Ds  D`)2   2

1  


Dm Ds` + 
E
2  E3 .
When  < D`(Ds+Dm)
D2m+D
2
`
and 2 < D
2
s`, the agents will rationally form a 3-agent lobby if
U^G   3  U^m`;m`   2 + U^s;m`

0@9k2

D2 +DsDm +DsD` +DmD`

c (4 + 9k)2
  3
1A   9k2D2m`
2c (4 + 9k)2
  2
!
+
9k2Ds Dm`
c (4 + 9k)2
2D2   (Dm  D`)2   2

1  


Ds Dm`  E3   E2 .
8.2.2 2 2

D2s`; D
2
m`

If E2 > D
2
s`, then the s and ` agents will choose to disband the lobby, even though it is stable
relative to other two-agent coalitions. If 2 2

D2s`; D
2
m`

, then both the s` and sm lobbies
would each impose a net cost on the its member agents, but the m` lobby would result in a
net gain to its members. Therefore, the m` lobby is the only two-agent coalition that would
feasibly form, regardless of the value of , as D2s`   2 > 0 ) 

D2s`   2

 08 2 [0; 1].
Suppose the m` coalition has formed. Then, if agent ` defects and joins the s` coalition, we
know that the instant later, that coalition will fall apart. However, if E2 < D
2
m`, then agent
m can o¤er a portion of the positive net coalition gain to agent `, which is better than what
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agent ` would obtain from defecting to the doomed s` coalition.
The agents will rationally form a 3-agent lobby if
U^G   3  U^m`;m`   2 + U^s;m`

0@9k2

D2 +DsDm +DsD` +DmD`

c (4 + 9k)2
  3
1A   9k2D2m`
2c (4 + 9k)2
  2
!
+
9k2Ds Dm`
c (4 + 9k)2
2D2   (Dm  D`)2   2

1  


Ds Dm`  E3   E2 .
8.2.3 2 > D2m`
If 2 > D
2
m`, then no two-agent lobby benets its members, so none will form. A 3-agent
lobby will form when
9k2(D2+DsDm+DsD`+DmD`)
c(4+9k)2
 3 > 0, orD2+DsDm+DsD`+DmD` > E3 .
8.3 Lobbyist captures all coalition gains:  = 0
Finally, we investigate the case where  = 0, which implies that agents are indi¤erent
across coalition structures, as the lobbyist extracts the full net gain from coalition formation.
Since agents are indi¤erent, the lobbyist determines the coalition structure. The lobbyist,
maximizing (5), always prefers to form the m` lobby over either the s` or the sm lobby. This
implies that the lobbyist will only form either the grand or the m` lobby. The equilibrium
lobbies are given by the following theorem.
Theorem 3 (Lobbyist-based coalitions) When  = 0,
1. E2 > D
2
m`, and
(a) E3 > 
G
I , the lobbyist will not form a coalition;
(b) E3 < 
G
I , the lobbyist will optimally form the grand lobby;
2. E2  D2m`, and
(a) E3   E2 > GI  D2m`, the lobbyist will optimally form the m` coalition;
(b) E3   E2  GI  D2m`, the lobbyist will optimally form the grand lobby.
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Note that the only di¤erence between the results in Theorems 2 and 3 are the thresholds
in parts 2.a and b. That is, the feasible coalition structures are the same once  < D`(Ds+Dm)
D2m+D
2
`
,
but when exactly the m` coalition is formed depends on whether the rms retain any share
of the gains from coalition formation. Relative to the grand lobby, the m` coalition is more
stable when agents retain some share of the gains because the increased utility of the non-
member agent enhances the stability of the 2-member coalition.
Appendix B
In this Appendix we discuss literature involving cooperative game theory and contrast our
o¤er-stability concept with notions of stability based on the core and bargaining sets.
Two important features of our model limit our ability to use well-known solution tech-
niques or to directly apply the results of earlier studies. First, the externalities of lobbying
in a policy regime with any degree of uniformity imply that the value of a given coalition
to its members depends on the overall coalition structure. Therefore, we cannot write a
function for the value of a coalition that depends only the characteristics of that coalition
and ignores the overall coalition structure (i.e., a characteristic function). As such, solutions
based on characteristic functions are not applicable (e.g., those based on the core and Shap-
ley value; see Myerson (2013)). Thrall and Lucas (1963) and Myerson (1978) analyze games
in partition function form where the value to a coalition depends on the entire coalition
structure. Thrall and Lucas (1963) present results primarily for 2- and 3-player games, and
allow for transfers across coalitions, which we prohibit. Myerson (1978) explores the role of
commitments to threat strategies, although these threats may not be sequentially rational
ex post. Kóczy (2007), Ray and Vohra (1997, 1999), and Yi (1997) also explore games with
externalities in which, by denition, a players utility is inuenced by the coalition structure
as long as the coalition structure inuences other playersequilibrium actions. Yi (1997)
develops rules for stable coalition structures in the presence of positive externalities, but
53
assumes (Yis condition P.2) that per-member payo¤s are decreasing in coalition size. In
our model, the payo¤ structure emerges as a function of the regulatory environment, and is
not in general characterized by per-member payo¤s that decrease in coalition size. Instead,
absent coalition costs, larger coalitions yield larger per-member payo¤s because coalitions
are able to eliminate the free-rider problem between all members.
Second, by the nature of our focus on the importance of regulatory uniformity, it is
crucial for the players, i.e., the agents in our model, to be heterogeneous. In a model with
homogeneous agents, restricting the regulator to any degree of regulatory uniformity is free,
as the regulator optimally desires to set homogeneous regulation across the cross-section of
agents. The lack of homogeneity means that we care about which agents are members of
which lobbies or coalitions, and cannot simply use coalition size as an outcome variable of
interest, as in the model of Bloch (2002). A benet of allowing for heterogeneity is that
we can derive predictions on which agents nd it optimal to associate with each other, and
which associations can be sustained in equilibrium (as in Baccara and Yariv, 2016).
Traditional notions of the core (e.g., Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944) and exten-
sions into cooperative games with externalities (e.g., Kóczy, 2007) rely on the concept of
blocking (Ray and Vohra, 1997, 2014). An allocation-structure pair (A;X) is blocked if
there is an alternative allocation-structure pair (A0; X 0) that makes a subset of players bet-
ter o¤, assuming that the subset of players can cause a deviation from (A;X) to (A0; X 0).
An allocation-structure pair is said to be in the core if it is not blocked by any achievable
alternative. Whether (A0; X 0) makes the deviating subset of players better o¤ depends on
how the other players, the residual players, react to the deviation to (A0; X 0). Various de-
nitions of cores have been put forth, with di¤erent assumptions about how the residual
players behave (i.e., whether the residual players are punitive towards the deviators, sup-
portive towards the deviators, or optimizers, as well as whether and how the residual players
rearrange themselves; see Kóczy (2007) for a concise discussion). Our o¤er-stability di¤ers
from the stability notion used in Ray and Vohra (1997), in which subsets of lj can deviate,
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but deviations always make the coalition structure ner, as the deviants are precluded from
joining with insiders who were not initially in lj. In contrast, we allow for the deviating
insiders to form coalitions with new partners.
A well-known problem with cores is that they can be empty or non-unique. Furthermore,
in games with superadditive payo¤ structures and fully transferable utility (i.e., in which
larger coalitions are always better), there is no loss in only considering how the spoils from
the grand coalition are allocated. Absent superadditivity, determining the coalition struc-
tures that are in the core is a non-trivial problem. Our setting features non-superadditive
payo¤s and admits an empty core in some cases (as described below). To avoid these core-
related problems, we introduce o¤er-stability as a means of determining agent-formed coali-
tion structures. Before proceeding, we dene core stability.
Denition 5 (Core stability) A feasible allocation-structure pair (A;X) is blocked if there
is a nonempty coalition in which each member is made weakly better o¤ and one member
is made strictly better o¤ in an alternative feasible allocation-structure pair (A0; X 0). An
allocation-structure pair (A;X) is in the core and the structure X is core-stable if (A;X) is
not blocked by any alternatives.
Under core stability, a given allocation has to be robust to all possible alternatives. That
is, the same allocation has to prevent any possible deviation if that allocation-structure pair
is in the core. Under o¤er-stability, the structure must be consistent, but we allow the
allocation within a structure to adjust to prevent blocking by di¤erent alternatives. For
example, suppose we are in the m` structure, with allocation A = fus; um; u`g = f1; 2; 2g.
Now, if the sm coalition formed, assume that any allocation A0 = fu0s; 3:5  u0s; 0:6g is
feasible, implying that sm have a budget of 3.5 to split between them. In this example,
allocation A is blocked by A0 = f1:1; 2:4; 0:6g because A0 makes agents s and m better o¤.
Assume 3 !1, so we only consider 2-agent coalitions. Clearly, the allocation provided
by I can be dominated by allocations in any of the two-agent coalition structures. In any
two-agent coalition, we must have us > 0:9, um > 1, and u` > 1:1. Now, any allocation
in X = sm is blocked, since either 3:5   u0s  1 ) m unilaterally deviates, or u0s  2:5,
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X A
G f 1; 1; 1g
sm fu0s; 3:5  u0s; 1:2g
s` fu00s ; 1:1; 4  u00sg
m` f1; u0m; 4:5  u0mg
I f0:9; 1; 1:1g
Table 3
Payo¤ Structure for a sample game
in which case s and ` can deviate to, for example, (s`; f2:6; 1:1; 1:4g). Therefore, sm is not
core-stable. An allocation in s` must have u00s > 0:9, implying u` < 4   0:9 = 3:1. But, in
this case, m and ` can deviate to (m`; f1; 1:3; 3:2g), implying that s` is not core-stable. For
m`, u0m > 1 prevents unilateral deviation of m, but m can also get up to 2:5 for deviating
with s to sm. Similarly, ` can get up to 3 for deviating with s to s`. It is impossible for
an allocation in m` to provide both u0m  2:5 and u` = 4:5   u0m  3 implying that any
allocation in m` is blocked by either sm or s`. Therefore, the core to the game above (again,
with 3 !1) is empty, and there is no core-stable coalition structure, as every allocation is
dominated by another allocation with an alternative structure. If, instead, the set of feasible
allocations in m` were f1; u0m; 5:7  u0mg, then the core would consist of (m`; f1; x; 5:7  xg),
with x 2 (2:5; 2:7).
Despite the lack of a core-stable coalition structure, there is an o¤er-stable coalition
structure, m`. The m` structure is o¤er-stable because: any deviation from m` to s` can
be prevented by giving ` at least 3 and still leaving m better o¤ with at least the 1.1 he
would receive under s`; and any deviation to sm can be prevented by giving m at least
2.5 while leaving ` with more than the 1.2 he would receive under sm. Clearly, these
cannot both be accomplished, but the can be accomplished as countero¤ers to proposals
received individually. Our nomenclature of o¤er-stability comes directly from the idea that
a coalition structure is o¤er-stable if coalition partners can be given countero¤ers that prevent
deviations. That is, if s proposes an allocation tom that involves a move to the sm structure,
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we allow ` to make a countero¤er to m to keep him in the coalition.
Myerson (2013) provides a concise and intuitive presentation of the bargaining set solution
to cooperative games introduced by Aumann and Maschler (1964). The discussion here
borrows from Myerson (2013). To set the stage, consider an N -player game in which the
value available to a coalition S in structureX is v (S;X). Consider an initial payo¤-structure
pair (A;XI), where the initial allocation is A and the initial coalition structure is XI . The
bargaining set is based on objections to allocations and counterobjections to those objections.
An objection by player (or set of players) i against another player (or set of players) g is an
allocation-coalition-structure triple, (A0; S;XS), such that A0 2 RN , S  N , i 2 S, g =2 S,
v (S;BS) =
P
k2S a
0
k, and A
0 >S A, where >S indicates that the players in S prefer allocation
A0 to allocation A and a0k is the payo¤ to player k in allocation A
0. A counterobjection to
is objection (A0; S;XS) against g and A is similarly a triple (A00; T; BT ) such that A00 2 RN ,
T  N , g 2 T , i =2 T , T \ S 6= ?, v (T;BT ) =
P
k2S a
00
k, A
00 >T A, and A00 >T\S A0. In
the counterobjection, player g can form a coalition T that takes away some of is partners
in the objection (but not i) and makes them at least as well o¤ as in the objection; thus, g
can restore himself/themselves and the other members of T to payo¤s at least as good as
they had in x. Additionally, all the players in T weakly prefer the allocation under A00 to the
allocation under A0. A payo¤-structure pair (A;X) is stable if there is a counterobjection to
each possible objection.
O¤er-stability relies on o¤ers and countero¤ers, which are essentially synonymous with
objections and counterobjections. The primary di¤erence is that with o¤er-stability, we
weaken the bargaining set to ensure only that player (or set of players) g is at least as well
o¤ under the countero¤er or counterobjection as he (they) would be if the original o¤er or
objection were accepted. That is, we replace A00 >T A with A00 >T A0.
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